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THE NATURAL LAW AND
COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE
WILLIAM R. WHITE*

F

Hammurabi, King of ancient Babylon,
declared in the prologue to his code of laws that he had "established
justice" in the world. Considering the state of affairs today, some of us
may think that Hammurabi's announcement was a wee bit premature.
Of course, justice has never been perfectly established, anywhere. However, the search for justice will always continue as one of the most compelling impulses of the human heart.
But, what is justice? What do we mean when we use the word
"justice"?
Probably, the most simple definition of the term justice is that justice
is the realization of what is right. Ulpian defined justice for the Roman
law when he said that it consists in rendering to each one that which is
his due. Justice is merely this, he said, that a transaction is just when
each person involved in it has received his due-when each person involved in it has been accorded his rights.
Ulpian's simple statement is, to my mind, a workable definition of
the term justice. However, even this simple definition needs some exposition. We need to know what is meant when we say that the persons
involved in a just transaction have received their due or have been
accorded their rights. What is their "due"? What are their "rights"?
Those who are familiar with the concept of natural law know that, in
the final analysis, when we say that a person has received his rights, we
mean that he has received his rights under the natural law. We are saying,
in other words, that when a transaction is just, it is just because it is in
compliance with the natural law, because the natural rights of the persons
involved in it have been respected.
You, as American lawyers and as members of the Catholic Lawyers
Guild, are, as I say, familiar with the natural law tradition. You know
that our American legal history is instinct with the philosophy of natural
law. I will not enter upon any detailed exposition of that philosophy.
OUR THOUSAND YEARS AGO,
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However, I believe it will not be out of
place to outline in broad strokes some of
the fundamental tenets of the natural law
philosophy. My thought is that a sketch of
some of those fundamentals may be helpful as preliminary material.

WILLIAM R. WHITE

We would be hard pressed to find a
more forceful or a more succinct expression of the philosophy of the natural law
than the eloquent phrases of our own
American Declaration of Independence.
Every school boy knows the immortal
words of our Founding Fathers:
When in the course of human events, it
becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume
among the powers of the earth, the separate
and equal station to which the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God entitle them,
a decent respect to the opinions of mankind
requires that they should declare the causes
which impel them to the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the
governed....
In that statement, our Founding Fathers
implied the whole natural law jurisprudence.
They stood in the tradition of the famous
lawyers who had preceded them through
the centuries-Cicero, Aquinas, Bellarmine, Suarez and all the others. In that
statement, the Founding Fathers declared
that man is the creature of God. They
recognized an all good and all wise Creator,
and they also recognized that such an all
good and all wise Creator could not be
guilty of a wasteful act or a purposeless
act. Hence, when He created man, He was
surely acting for a purpose. God, having
a purpose for man to fulfill, could not be
indifferent to what man does. So, God
must desire that each man accomplish the
purpose for which He made him. He must
wish that each man use all his capacities,
without wasting them, in order to bring
about the greatest practical development
and perfection of his human nature. The
natural law philosophy, therefore, teaches
that God commands man to participate in
His Divine Plan and bring himself by his
actions to the perfection of his human
nature, eventually even attaining to union
with God Himself.
These truths our Founding Fathers
knew, and they properly concluded that it
must be God's will that each of us be provided with the necessary means and the
necessary tools to carry out the commands
placed upon us by God. In other words,
they saw that to carry out the Divine Plan
each of us must be accorded rights, each
of us is entitled to whatever is necessary
as a means for us to carry out our obligations to God. This concept of the Rights
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of Man our Founding Fathers expressed
by saying that all men are endowed by
their Creator with "unalienable rights."
They mentioned as among those unalienable rights Life and Liberty, and of course
they included whatever other rights are
necessary to the pursuit of eternal happiness, such as the right of property and of
due process.
In their natural law philosophy, the
Founding Fathers clearly saw the proper
function of the state and government. They
recognized civil society as a necessary institution for the human race, and they saw
that the purpose of civil society in the
Divine Plan was to secure man's natural
rights. By gathering in communities, by the
division of labor made possible in communal society, by the exchange of ideas
and goods facilitated in communal society,
men are able to improve themselves more
rapidly and attain more expeditiously to
the degree of perfection which God desires
of them. Civil society secures men in their
social activities and guarantees them the
natural rights which they need in order to
carry out God's will. In civil society, the
conditions of peace and order necessary
for the development of men are produced,
as well as all the other conditions required
as part of the "common good."
In brief, then, the basic idea of natural
law is that every human being is a creature
of God. He is commanded by God to fit
himself into God's Divine Plan, thus perfecting his own human nature. In order to
carry out this command, each human being
must be accorded the means necessary for
him. These are his rights, his natural rights.
Society and the state exist to create conditions helpful to man's attainment of his
individual perfection.

Once we have the notion that each of
us has natural rights, we have the idea of
justice. The demand of justice is simply
that natural rights be respected. Justice is
really the realization of the natural law.
Justice is giving to each that which he
ought to have in accordance with his natural rights.
The fourfold division of justice considered at the Natural Law Conference is
somewhat unusual. Traditionally, justice
has been considered as falling into a threefold division. That division comprehended
(1) commutative justice, (2) distributive
justice, and (3) legal justice. But, many
modern writers are introducing a fourth
division-"social justice."
A word in explanation of these fourfold
divisions is advisable. Commutative Justice
first. Commutative justice is found in transactions between individuals, in exchanges
between individuals. Thus, where a buyer
and a seller agree to exchange merchandise
for money, you have a contract of exchange
which raises problems of commutative justice. When two states make an international
tax treaty, problems of commutative justice are involved.
Distributive Justice. Distributive justice
regulates the duties of the state in its exercise of authority over individuals in the
state. Provision by the state of public facilities for education would be an example
of an activity regulated by distributive
justice.
Legal Justice. This concerns the correctness of the treatment of the state by the
individual citizen of the state. Reporting
of your income for taxes raises questions
of legal justice.
Social Justice, the fourth type of justice,
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regulates the duties which the citizen owes
to the community as a whole rather than
to the government of the state. Those who
recognize "social justice" as a fourth division of justice seem to distinguish it from
legal justice on the ground that social justice regulates the duties of a citizen to the
community as a whole, whereas legal justice regulates his duties to the government.
My concern is with commutative justice.
As I said, commutative justice regulates
exchanges between individuals. Voluntary
exchanges, a sale of goods or a purchase
of a house, for example, are regulated by
commutative justice. Commutative justice
must also be considered in cases involving
recompense or restitution for damage done.
Thus, if I injure my neighbor by driving
my automobile carelessly and he suffers a
fracture of the leg, I must recompense him
with money. The question whether the
recompense is just and fair will be regulated by the principles of commutative justice. An exchange is involved in that case,
although it may not be a voluntary exchange, but one compelled by the courts
of law.
With this as the recognized scope of
commutative justice, that it regulates exchanges between individuals, and transactions between individuals, we come to
the question, "What are the standards of
commutative justice? What are the characteristics of an exchange which is really
just? What are the marks of a transaction
which reflects commutative justice?"
Philosophers have written upon this
subject rather sparsely. Nevertheless, the
basic idea drawn from them, from the
writings of such a man as Del Vecchio in
his treatise on Justice, the basic idea is that
an exchange or a transaction will be just

if there is an "equalization" of values in it.
Thus, if I exchange a house in Town A,
having a market value of $20,000, for a
house in Town B, having a similar market
value, the exchange involves equal values
and commutative justice is satisfied.
Again, if I, by accident, injure another
with my automobile and he is confined to
his home and unable to work for two
weeks (but that is his only damage), then
when I reimburse him for two weeks' wages
lost, commutative justice is satisfied. However, should he be seriously injured and
suffer a permanent loss of earning power,
then the damages to be paid him should
reflect the diminution of his earning power
over the expectancy of his working career,
if the necessary equivalence is to appear.
This notion of equalization of values is
fundamental to the philosophic concept of
commutative justice. It is not a carry-over
of the primitive law idea of reprisal, the
idea of "an eye for an eye." It is rather a
consequence of the recognition of the right
of private property. Under the natural
law, each man must be recognized as
having the right of private property. Because man owns property with such an
unalienable natural right, another man
may not deprive him of his property, unless, in return, some equivalent value flows
to the one who gives up the property. The
wrongdoer must, therefore, restore to the
injured person the property of which the
injured person was deprived by the wrongful act. And in a voluntary exchange, unless something of substantially equal value
is transferred to the party who yields up
his property, he may find himself without
the necessary means of accomplishing his
duties under the Divine Plan.
There is a lesson here for each of us
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from this emphasis on equivalence: that it
is our duty, when we are involved in exchanges (which are not gifts or acts of
charity), to see that the other party receives
fairly equal value to the value yielded up.
Of course, there will be questions of valuation when the chief value attached to a
thing is a subjective one. But the principle
of equalization brings home to us that a
lack of proportion and a lack of equivalence
in a transaction points to an unjust transaction prima facie.
Having in mind, then, that the principles
of commutative justice are to be applied
when considering contracts of exchange,
and having in mind, further, that where an
exchange is involved those principles of
commutative justice call for a certain
equalization of values, let us turn to the
questions which have been suggested for
discussion by the Chairman of the
Conference.
A prepared statement has been distributed to you. I would like to refer to it. You
notice that the statement gives us a picture
of the current industrial scene. It draws
in broad strokes an outline of the impressive development of our national economy.
It points out (among other phases of the
industrial scene) the recent pattern of
labor relations as showing some significant
changes. It then raises certain questions
for comment by us:
What problems of commutative justice
are involved in the negotiation of collective
bargaining agreements between management and labor? May a union demand a
voice in the management prerogatives of
quantity of production? Price of products
sold? Location of plants? Number and
qualifications of employees hired? May a
union ask for a look-see at the books of the
company showing profits and wages paid
employees in different wage classifications?

What it really asks is three basic questions. First of all, we are asked to list the
problems of commutative justice which we
believe are involved in the current labor
negotiations. Secondly, we are asked
whether a union may demand that it participate in the management of a business,
as a matter of commutative justice. Thirdly,
whether the books of a business should be
open to union representatives in connection
with collective bargaining.
With respect to the first question,
wherein we are asked for a list of the
problems of commutative justice involved
in current labor negotiations, I would say
that in the past year collective 6argaining
conferences have concerned themselves
with two problems of commutative justice.
The first is the problem of the nature and
extent of a "just wage," and the second is
the problem of the right of a union to demand a voice in the management of a
business.
Perhaps I am over-simplifying things
when 1 say that only two problems of commutative justice have been involved in the
current labor negotiations. You may point
out .that in the past year unions have
emphasized demands for pension plans,
for welfare insurance plans, and for supplementary unemployment compensation.
But these demands are merely demands for
wages-for deferred wages (with the company paying the increased cost)-not directly to the employee in his pay envelope
but by putting aside funds in a trust to
provide future pensions and future unemployment compensation and future hospitalization and medical treatment. The
problem involved in these demands is
whether the amount of money required for
these benefits can fairly be demanded by
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the laboring man as a "just wage."
The second question is the one which
has been selected today for more detailed
discussion. That question is whether commutative justice requires that labor have a
voice in the management of a business.
The question is whether, as a matter of
commutative justice under the natural law,
our industry in the United States should
be organized so that laboring men or their
representatives may participate in the management of business. This question calls
for some hard thinking and, in the end, my
conclusion is only tentative.
In my opinion, ladies and gentlemen,
the principles of commutative justice do
not require that labor be given a voice in
the management of a business under the
present conditions of industry in the
United States.
Do the writings of the moralists throw
any light on this problem? The answer
seems to be in the negative. The moralists
seem quite divided in their thinking, and
none of them seem to have any extended
analysis of the matter. Their reluctance
may be due to the fact that proposals for
labor-management partnership have 'not
been advanced in sufficient detail to permit
thorough analysis. It seems that labormanagement partnership is one of the
long-range objectives of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations. Walter Reuther
and the late president Philip Murray of the
C. I. 0. both strongly indorsed what they
called the Industrial Council Plan. The
1948 convention of the C. I. 0., held in
Portland, Oregon, adopted a number of
resolutions approving the "industrial council plan." According to that plan, there
would be established in each industry an
economic council which would perform all

fundamental management functions. Each
council would be composed of representatives of the workers, owners, government
and general public. The 1948 resolution of
the C. I. 0. states that key decisions in an
industry, such as the rate of capital investment, the prices of goods, the size and
location of plants and the sales policies of
the corporation should be governed by
industry councils.
Some of the moralists and ethicians have
pointed to a statement by the Holy Father,
Pius XI, as an indorsement of labor-management partnership. In the Encyclical
Quadragesimo A nno, Pius XI said:
In the present state of human society,
however, We deem it advisable that the
wage contract should, when possible, be
modified somewhat by a contract of partnership, as is already being tried in various
ways to no small gain both of the wageearners and of the employers. In this way
wage-earners are made sharers of some sort
in the ownership, or the management, or
the profits. 1
Other moralists, who feel that a labormanagement partnership is not required by
the natural law (at least in the present condition of American capitalism) say that the
statement of Pius XI is merely a piece of
mild advice and a passing observation of
secondary importance. They point to statements by Pope Pius XII and say that Pius
XII thought it a distortion of the words of
Pope Pius XI to interpret them as requiring a labor-management partnership as a
matter of justice. Pope Pius XII did say in
1952 in a radio address in Vienna that
commutative justice does not require a
partnership between labor and management. His statement was:
I Quadragesimo Anno, para. 65, FIVE GREAT ENCYCLICALS

144 (Paulist Press 1953).
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Herein lie the deeper motives why the
Popes of the social encyclicals, and We
Ourselves, have declined to infer either directly or indirectly from the nature of the
labor contract the right of the worker to
co-ownership in the operating capital, and
its corollary, co-determination in the conduct of the business. Such a right must
be denied because of more basic issues
involved.?

Further, in 1952, Monsignor Montini,
the Vatican's Substitute Secretary of State,
wrote:
Our Holy Father, Pope Pius XII, has
many times referred to the juridico-social
position of the'Workers in industry, accurately distinguishing what belongs within
the sphere of natural law, from that which
forms part of the aspirations of the working classes and which can consequently be
pursued by legitimate means as an ideal.
He warned, in fact, that
'A danger arises when one insists that
the salaried workers in a company should
have the right of economic co-management,
especially when the exercise of this right is,
in fact, subject, directly or indirectly, to
organizations foreign to the company itself.
Now, neither the nature of the work-contract nor the nature of the business necessarily imply, in themselves, such a right....
The wisdom of Our Predecessor, Pius XI,
showed this clearly in the Encyclical 'Quadragesimo Anno' and, accordingly, there is
denied-therein the intrinsic need of patterning the work-contract on the contract of
3
partnership.'
Because of these statements and later
disputes among the moralists, we must say
that there has been no clear indication one
way or the other by the moralists on the

question whether participation by labor in
industrial management is required by commutative justice.

When we turn to our legal authorities,
we find the situation similar. There are no
legal guideposts for us. As you know, Section 9. (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act 4 provides that the duly elected
representative of the employees shall be
their representative for bargaining for
"rates of pay, wages, hours of employment
or other conditions of employment." You
all know, also, that in the Inland Steel
Corporation case 5 the Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the question whether a
company was required to bargain about a
pension and retirement plan. There the
union desired to obtain a modification ot
the compulsory retirement feature of the
company pension plan. The corporation
felt that such a modification of its pension
plan was not a matter of "rates of pay or
wages" and that it was not required to
bargain with the union concerning that
feature of the plan. However, the Supreme
Court held that the pension plan was "one
of the conditions of employment" and it
ordered the company to bargain concerning that condition of employment.
In Cross v. National Labor Relations
Board,6 the Circuit Court of Appeals developed the idea of the Inland Steel case
further and held that a company was required to bargain with a union with respect
to group health and accident insurance
plans. The court felt that bargaining with
respect to such a plan was practically the
same thing as bargaining with respect to
wages.
tini, to Archbishop Siri of Genoa, September 22,
1952, id. at 36.

2 Radio Address of His Holiness, Pope Pius X1l,
to the Austrian Katholikentag in Vienna, Septem-

461 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a)
(1952), amending 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
5 Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 170 F. 2d 247 (7th

ber 14, 1952, Six SOCIAL DOCUMENTS OF His

Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U. S. 960 (1948).

HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII 32 (1953).

6 W. W. Cross & Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B. 174 F.

3 Letter of His Excellency Monsignor G. B. Mon-

2d 875 (lst Cir. 1949).
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When one reads the court cases on the
subject, one gets the impression that the
courts believe that benefits demanded by
unions, by way of wages, pension plans, or
insurance plans, are all economic benefits
which may be translated into money and
are the proper subjects of collective bargaining. But it is really a different thing for
a union to demand that its representatives
be given partnership rights in a business
and take part in making management decisions. Asking for money or for the things
that money can buy, like welfare plans or
supplementary unemployment compensation, is one thing; asking for power, for
management's power of decision, is another
thing. It is the career officer asking for
command - not money. The courts have
said that unions are entitled to demand, as
a matter of statutory law, economic benefits which the employer can satisfy by paying out money. No case, as far as I know,
has said that an employer must bargain
with a union if it demands power, management's power, to make business decisions.
The absence of guideposts in the writings
of moralists and in the decided cases, gives
us a certain comfortable sense of freedom.
We can strike out for ourselves and face
and decide on our own whether the principles of commutative justice require that
labor be given a voice in the management
of business.
First of all, let us ask whether the
principle of equivalence requires that labor
be given a voice in management. When we
look at the relationship between labor and
the enterprise, and when we study the employees who are not in the management
group, we see manual laborers willing to
offer their energies, mental and physical,

to working upon materials supplied by the
employer, with tools supplied by the employer, and we see clerical workers willing
to spend their energies on the books and
accounts of the employer in an office supplied by the employer. Now, our question
is: Is there anything in the nature of their
work that means it cannot be fairly compensated for in money? Is there anything
in the nature of this exchange, in which the
laborers offer their mental' and physical
energies to the enterprise, that indicates that
their offer cannot be fairly compensated
for by money, by a just wage? We have
a situation where the owner of the business
is paying management to make business
decisions. It is paying management to assume the responsibilities of command, to
do the work of making the necessary research, acquiring the necessary information
and, finally, making the decisions. It is paying the laboring group to expend their
mental and physical energies in the enterprise otherwise than by making the decisions. Do the principles of commutative
justice indicate that labor must participate
in the work of management? Can labor be
compensated for its services by receiving
a just wage, or is it necessary that labor
pass over into the sphere of management
and do part of the work of management?
Assuming that laborers are receiving sufficient compensation in money to take care
of their families, to save for their old age
and to acquire some property, is such a
wage a fair equivalent for the laborers'
services? Those who say that labor must
participate in management maintain that
something more than- mere wages is needed
to requite the worker. Why must the laboring man participate in the president's decisions as to what products should be
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marketed? Why must union representatives
advise the vice-president for advertising,
on the selection of television or radio or
newspaper advertising? Why should the
factory man or the union accountant sit
with the treasurer when he determines that
the method of business expansion shall be
through debentures rather than through
common stock?
In my opinion, there is nothing in the
nature of the services rendered that indicates that fair compensation sometimes
requires that the laboring man be afforded
an opportunity to take on additional burdens, the burdens of management. Commutative justice requires that when the
laborer gives up his property in the form
of his energies, mental or physical, he be
given other property in return to equate
for the property yielded up by him. "Other
property" here would be money wages or
the tangible things that money can buy.
Certainly, it seems incongruous to suggest
that, as compensation for the laborer's
work, he be given not other property or
more wages but that he be called upon to
assume additional burdens and to do further work, this time by way of doing the
work of management.
It would seem that the only justification
for a demand on the part of the laboring
man for management power would be the
claim that management is incompetent to
carry on its functions or that management
is planning to disrupt the business and impair the security of the laboring man's job.
And, certainly, management in American
industry is not generally incompetent, nor
is there any widespread desire on the part
of American executives to terminate the
business in which they are engaged and
thus destroy their own jobs.

Some may emphasize the fact that, after
all, a business enterprise is a cooperative
enterprise. It involves an alliance of the
worker and management and capital. And
they may argue that the worker has a right,
along with the investor, to have a voice in
the selection of the managing officials.
Workers, like stockholders, should cast
votes for directors who, in turn, elect the
management.
This suggestion has a certain appeal. It
is true that one can find industries where
workers and stockholders have been, over
the years, faithful partners in the enterprise. Possibly the American Telephone
Company has something of this character.
Many thousands of its employees have
devoted their entire lives to the business. Likewise, thousands of faithful shareholders have kept their investment in the
company and contributed loyally when
called' upon for additional capital. However, there are other businesses which are
entirely different in their character. The
great ranches of the far west have a great
number of seasonal workers, among whom
there is a great turn-over. Other industries
have large numbers of transitory workers.
I recall one company, an aircraft and camera corporation, which during the early
1940's had, each year, almost a 50%
turn-over of the working force, even
though the wages paid by the company
were fine wages.
If workers are to be partners, the question is raised whether they are prepared to
assume the responsibilities of partners and
share in the losses of the company. Generally, management executives throughout
the country retain their jobs only by continued success. If the company's profits
diminish, most corporations will not take
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excuses. There may have been strikes;
there may have been unexpected material
shortages; there may have been unanticipated competitive surprises to excuse a bad
period. However, management must retire
if the company is not successful, no matter
how substantial its excuses might be. If
labor is now to become influential in
management's decisions, is the laboring
man prepared to face the same prospect as
unsuccessful management faces? In the
nature of things, laboring men cannot assume the risks of failure.
As far as the investor is concernedthe owner of the business, the shareholder
-he is willing to place his property, his
investment, in the control of a small, carefully selected management group. But if
labor is to participate in management,
and the invested capital is impaired as a
result of a bad decision, will labor be willing to contribute to the corporation to
make up for the impairment of capital?
Will it be willing to share losses which its
poor advice may bring upon the corporation?
The last consideration is that, as a
practical matter, participations by labor
unions in decisions of policy could greatly
impair the efficiency of a corporation. If
union officials participate in the management, how can management's decisions be
kept secret from its competitors, when the
same union officials will be participating
in the management of the competitors because the competing companies have
workers belonging to the same union?
For all these reasons, it seems to me
that, while labor may insist upon a just
wage, it -may insist upon pension plans,
supplementary unemployment compensation and a share in the profits of a corpo-

ration, I do not see that it can insist upon
command or upon participation in command. The principles of commutative
justice do not require that labor be permitted to assume the responsibilities of
management. The nature of the laboring
man's services are not such that it is unfair
to ask him to leave management to the
managers., An enterprise, like a football
team, works well only when all are inspired
by a common desire for success. The
laboring man is on the team, and he should
have a share in the glory that comes from
success; but there is no reason why he has
to play quarterback and call the signals.
There is no injustice to the laboring man if
the investors in the corporation feel that
the management group whom they have
employed to manage the corporation should
have the sole responsibility for that job.
In summary, let me say that I have tried
to emphasize as the essence of commutative justice the notion of equivalence. Exchanges and transactions will be just when
they comply with the requirements of the
natural law, when the property rights of
the parties are respected, but, chiefly, when
the exchange involves equivalent values. It
is also obvious that, even when great nations are concerned, exchanges by persons
who have no moral authority to deal with
the property which is the subject matter of
the exchange are unjust.
Applying the secondary principle of the
natural law to particular cases is not easy,
particularly in the fluid fields of labor relations and international relations, and
even though I may have expressed myself
with some force during the past few
minutes, please believe me when I say that
I am expressing my own opinions, humbly
subject to correction.

